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**THE ROLE OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS IN  
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY**

BY

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**The Role of Humanitarian Relief Organizations in National Security Strategy**

by

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## ABSTRACT

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An increase in the numbers and types of peace operations necessitates a study into the interaction of military forces with non-governmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, international/regional organizations, and religious organizations (collectively referred to as humanitarian relief organizations (HROs)). Philosophical and organizational differences must be recognized and then reconciled to plan, train, and execute successful peace operations.



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## THE ROLE OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS IN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

### THE CHALLENGE AHEAD

The security challenges facing the United States are increasingly complex and require the skills and resources of many organizations. Humanitarian relief organizations (HROs) are diverse, flexible, independent, and relief-focused. Their assets and capabilities should be factored into the commander's assessment of conditions and resources and should be integrated into courses of action.<sup>1</sup> The complexity of future operations short of major theater warfare requires United States military forces to participate effectively with HROs as elements of a unified international effort. This relationship, while at times ambiguous, is effective in dealing with conflict prevention and the aftermath of conflicts. Despite philosophical and operational differences, coordination is the vital link between the military instrument of power and HROs. Together they respond to crises and help shape the world environment in ways that would have been inconceivable only a few decades ago. Of great importance is the development of joint doctrine and organizations that translate that doctrine into effective leadership. This integrated approach to achieving national objectives makes optimum use of skills and resources provided by United States military forces and HROs. Early dialogue between strategic, operational, and tactical military leaders and HROs will provide the link between strategic aims and tactical employment of capabilities. Ultimate success can be achieved only if United States military forces are educated, trained, and organized to work with those that play a vital role in future humanitarian assistance operations – the HROs. The result is an integrated civil-military team that functions as an effective instrument of United States National Security Strategy (NSS).

HROs are highly visible participants with significant influence on the world scene. One inevitable consequence of the increase in the visibility and numbers of HROs is the proliferation of terminology to describe them. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are transnational entities of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations (UN). They may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities.<sup>2</sup> Normally, this term designates those organizations outside the United States. Private voluntary organizations (PVOs) are non-profit humanitarian assistance organizations involved in development and relief activities.<sup>3</sup> Some are regionally focused while others are active worldwide. Characterizations that most HROs are primarily based in the

United States are incorrect. Most nations have HROs with the capability to operate internally, as did Somali HROs during Operation Restore Hope.<sup>4</sup> International organizations have global influence, such as the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Marginal differences in the definitions exist elsewhere. For example, InterAction, an alliance of over 50 United States-based HROs, defines NGOs as non-profit, private entities involved in humanitarian issues; they are not a part of any government, although they may work in partnership with a government. Additionally, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) defines PVOs with the same criteria. For ease of reference, the term HRO will be used to collectively identify NGOs, PVOs, international organizations (IOs), and those affiliated with religious organizations.

## **COMPREHENDING THE DEPTHS OF HROS**

### **IN GENERAL**

There are in excess of 36,400 HROs of varying size, degree of activity, financial strength, geographical location of their headquarters, and structure.<sup>5</sup> The United States military most often operates in conjunction with those HROs recognized by the UN, which is about 2,000 of that number. The UN provides consultative status to those organizations concerned with matters that conform to the spirit, purposes, and principles of the UN Charter. It tasks the HROs with promoting knowledge of the UN principles and activities in accordance with its own aims and purposes. The ECOSOC considers applications to ensure participation from all regions, particularly from developing countries, to achieve a just, balanced, effective, and genuine involvement. Voluntary financial contributions to HROs from national affiliates or individuals are reported to ECOSOC by amount and donor. Contributions from other sources not meeting these requirements must be explained. All financial contributions are to be devoted to the purposes of the UN.<sup>6</sup>

HROs serve as implementing agents of official organizations or pursue independent missions. They generally fall into four categories: human rights, relief, nation building or economic enhancement, and environmental. As powerful actors in the international scene, HROs can influence the countries in which they operate by the amount of aid provided. They are diverse groups that vary considerably in size and focus of activities. Some smaller HROs provide services and coordinate efforts for others. Although small, they provide legitimacy and are a funnel through which larger programs are carried.

## FUNDING

HRO operating budgets range from \$1 million to \$600 million. Their range of capabilities is closely tied to their organization's size and budget. Some are self-contained with the ability to carry out large-scale operations. Others do not have the wherewithal to fully support their programs. They may collect relief items but have no transportation available to distribute them. They range from small groups of self-supporting, volunteer workers to organizations whose structures rival those of small nations. Their missions range from handing out food directly to the hungry to developing regional or national infrastructure for long term development or the restoration of entire economies. Some HROs have religious connections while others explicitly maintain distance from such affiliation.

Since HROs do not generate enough public support to sustain their programs in the field, they rely on private funding from benefactors and constituents. As such, they have their own governing rules not bound to any state or government. Contributors, always anxious to know where their money goes, pay particular attention to media coverage of assistance operations. HROs use the media as a powerful force in shaping public attitudes and policy development. They use media coverage of a conflict as a way to generate cash contributions.<sup>7</sup> A specific crisis can garner more donations if an organization's involvement is highlighted. HROs are highly visible players with significant influence throughout the world. Some even establish their own communications networks to report their efforts. This direct action approach provides an opportunity to raise the conscience level of donors while maintaining an HRO's individualism. HROs can market their organizational identity and mission to tap into motivational force to serve others. When they touch the heartstrings of the public, it is a catalyst for altruistic responses. Efforts of relief-oriented organizations, in particular, have gained widespread approval and recognition. The respect given to Medicins san Frontiers and Food for the Hungry are examples of this.

## INFLUENCING POLICY

HROs either welcome government connection or purposely avoid it. They act in certain circumstances as implementers of United States foreign policy. For example, when HROs helped to demobilize military forces after peace agreements in Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Angola, they carried out European and American policy. Additionally they agreed to help implement the peace accords when concluded.<sup>8</sup> Some do so deliberately because they are not offended by the policy; others do so unknowingly because they are naïve; and others act as if politics had no role in their decisions, which simply means they serve political objectives

unintentionally. The assistance HROs provide to one side or the other is as valuable as currency and translates into power for the receiver. Their very presence and their potential to assist can define success or failure for a country. That in itself is a political act. However, insisting they are void of political association may foster confidence in their credibility and contribute to their security in a country in crisis. When they coordinate with United States military forces, HROs become associated with the political decision that led to the military's deployment.

HROs can be staunch lobbyists. They provide information to policy makers and media to promote their objectives. The concept that government alone cannot meet the range of human needs is a basic assumption for the existence of HROs. Pressure on Congress to declare an emergency in an area can result in funds being raised and assets being sent. The competition for resources among HROs is closely tied to media coverage. They rely on the government and the media to make a crisis known to the public, and they begin their actions from that point.

#### **USAID'S OFFICE OF FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE (OFDA)**

USAID plays a major role in United States foreign policy implementation and a principal role in interagency coordination. It is the nerve center for humanitarian relief work of the United States government. Under the policy direction of the Secretary of State, USAID acts as the lead federal agency for United States foreign disaster assistance. It administers the President's authority to coordinate response to international disasters through its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). OFDA provides emergency relief and long-term humanitarian assistance when the Ambassador of the affected country declares a disaster. It can expedite interventions at the operational and tactical levels through HROs. Geographical combatant commanders can coordinate directly with OFDA to obtain assistance efforts.<sup>9</sup>

In addition to the formal relationship some United States-based HROs have with the UN, those that operate abroad maintain a formal relationship with OFDA. Its mission is to save lives and reduce human suffering in natural and man-made disasters outside the United States and to minimize the consequences of disasters before they occur through prevention, mitigation and preparedness interventions. OFDA supports humanitarian response systems through funding, information, advocacy, coordination, and negotiation.

OFDA's funding for grants to the UN, ICRC, and other HROs assists in sustaining relief and rehabilitation programs. HROs that apply for grants tailor their proposals to fit OFDA's strategic priorities. OFDA's annual budget for humanitarian assistance operations is based on

four factors: field assessments of humanitarian need from Disaster Assistance Relief Teams (DART), what they can contribute to the aggregate amount after determining what other donors are providing, whether the adversaries in the conflict area and logistic/transportation constraints will allow agencies access to those in need, and whether any HROs will apply for grant assistance. OFDA's budget is constantly revised based on the volatility of known areas of conflict and the emergence of new conflicts. OFDA relies on HROs as operating partners. When none are willing to respond, funding will not be provided even to the most visible disasters.

OFDA is the principal advocate for humanitarian policy issues within the United States government and is the source of policy recommendations to the National Security Council (NSC) and the State Department. Through testimony to Congress and commentary to the media, OFDA influences public and congressional opinion on complex emergencies. This visibility allows OFDA a platform to influence the policy agenda for public debate on humanitarian assistance issues. Its bureaucratic leverage from public visibility influences United States foreign policy. The senior staff of OFDA regularly attends meetings of the NSC deputies committee. This allows OFDA to raise with other policy makers the consequences of various political strategies as well as the political steps needed to resolve issues.

In the field, OFDA coordinates HRO operations in the absence of the UN. It also acts as the interface between United States military forces and HROs; it is the authority that approves requests for military assistance before the military will act. Its formal coordination mechanism is the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) established by the Joint Force Commander (JFC), which it jointly staffs and manages with United States military forces.

OFDA negotiates protocols with foreign governments and rebel groups to transport relief supplies across lines of conflict, to protect HRO personnel and programs, and to avoid taxes on distributed relief supplies. These protocols can become the basis for permanent UN agreements in conflicts. Conducting these negotiations is the most influential and least visible OFDA role.<sup>10</sup>

### **OPERATION RESTORE HOPE – A CASE STUDY**

The complex lines of responsibility and overlapping/diverging missions of HROs and the United States military can make coordination during a military operation other than war (MOOTW) particularly difficult. Lack of mutual understanding of and unfamiliarity with the different organizational cultures of both entities complicate the civil-military relationship. Moreover, there is mutual institutional resistance to such coordination. Misconceptions can be

exaggerated by no clear coordination structure; the military's view that it has only one function (e.g., security for convoys to deliver relief supplies); the HROs' expectation that the military will solve all its problems; and the negative stereotypes each might hold for the other.

Understanding the way an organization is trained and the values enhanced by association in that organization is the first step toward success.

Concerned by the magnitude of human suffering caused by the conflict in Somalia, the UN established a United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I). Its mission was to provide humanitarian assistance to the affected population.<sup>11</sup> Alarmed by the continuation of hostilities in Somalia that lead to continued loss of life and destruction of property, the UN increased the strength of UNOSOM I and established a Unified Task Force (UNITAF). From 8 December 1992 to 4 May 1993, United States military forces, as part of UNITAF, were deployed to Somalia to conduct Operation Restore Hope.<sup>12</sup> The UNITAF forces found an already existing, although largely uncoordinated, relief effort being conducted by various HROs.

After the overthrow of Somali President Siad Barre's military dictatorship in early 1991, a civil war, fueled by ancient inter-clan hatred, ensued. The poor economic situation and resultant food crisis, exacerbated by a drought in mid-1992, killed more than 300,000 and put another 1.5 million Somalis at risk.<sup>13</sup> With the growth of the famine, whoever had food had power. Armed for survival and income, Somalis looted and extorted HRO shipments. It was a way of life with an entire economic system built around it.

Responding to public opinion and assistance requests from HROs, the UN initiated relief efforts. After local clans repulsed its early efforts, the UN identified the situation as a threat to international peace and security and authorized member states to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations. As part of the multilateral response, President Bush deployed United States Central Command (USCINCCENT) forces to Somalia to address a major humanitarian calamity, avert related threats to international peace and security, and protect the safety of Americans and others engaged in relief operations.<sup>14</sup> The mission, assigned to the Commander, Joint Task Force, Somalia, was to conduct joint/combined military operations in Somalia to secure major airports and sea ports, key installations, and food distribution points; to provide security for convoys and relief operations; to provide open and free passage of relief supplies; and to assist the UN and HROs in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices.<sup>15</sup>

Operation Restore Hope, what may be considered a first for United States major force projection in an humanitarian assistance to support UN relief efforts, identified several aspects of civil-military relationship to consider when planning and training for future peace operations.<sup>16</sup>

First, and foremost, the lack of mutual understanding of and familiarity with the different organizational cultures of the military and HROs must be addressed. Misconceptions were exacerbated by no clear command structure; the military's initial view that their only mission was to provide security for, not assist, the HROs; the HROs' expectation that the military would solve all their problems; and the negative stereotypes that each held for the other.

HROs had been in Somalia since the 1980's and viewed the arrival of the military as a control mechanism being forced upon them. They believed the military would disregard their accomplishments-to-date in infrastructure and agriculture improvements; severely hamper or discontinue their delivery programs; and be seen by the Somalis as an occupying army, thus renewing fighting in the capital. They saw the military as inflexible, politically conservative, and excessively bureaucratic. On the other hand, the military officers considered the HROs inefficient, politically liberal, over-educated, and anti-military.<sup>17</sup> Thrown into the endeavor with little knowledge or personal experience with past humanitarian interventions, the resulting effort was impressive.

Independent and hard working, the HROs in Somalia were loose-knit groups with little emphasis on detailed planning and no established chain of command. They maximized the delegation of decision-making to compensate for the rapid turnover among HRO staffs. Military personnel, on the other hand, were accustomed to defined, established command and control hierarchies. Their decision-making was centralized and objective driven.

A second problem was the aggregation of several related ones categorized as support. Since there was no sovereign nation to provide host nation support to the HROs, they overburdened UNITAF with direct requests for logistic, engineer, legal, health care, civilian air carrier, and military aircraft transportation support. Having little precedent for providing HROs with this type of support created a dilemma for UNITAF.

The third, and probably most contentious, problem for the HROs was that of having their weapons confiscated. Although it was excluded from the mission statement, disarmament became an implied UNITAF task. Initially, the policy was to seize all crew-served and individual weapons openly brandished with hostile intent. Armed drivers had been hired by HROs to protect relief supply deliveries. Seizing their weapons became a conflict between the objectives of the military and the security needs of the HROs. There are varied reasons for the discord: UNITAF viewed the relief guards with suspicion because it believed they turned to banditry at night; weapons confiscation policies varied from sector to sector which left the relief workers defenseless as they crossed different sector borders; and there were tighter security measures in the Mogadishu humanitarian relief sector (HRS) than in any other.<sup>18</sup>

When UNITAF disarmed the Somali security guards hired by the HROs, it removed their protection. Combined with the inconsistencies in the policy on arms from sector to sector, it became apparent that a system for identification was required. It would provide access to facilities and prevent confusion when crossing HRS borders. The first issue of standardized and serialized cards was unsuccessful. They did not include names and photos and were easily transferred among personnel or were duplicated. Nor did they provide information on where and how weapons could be carried. A second issue with photos and details on the weapons had greater success.<sup>19</sup>

The UN established a Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) to prioritize, plan, support, and monitor the delivery of relief supplies into the central distribution points in each of nine HRSs. It coordinated escorts for convoys, security for HROs, humanitarian and civil assistance projects, and weapons confiscation. Directed by a UN official with assistance from OFDA and UNITAF, the HOC included representatives from the operational levels of the United States military, HROs and, the UN. Within the HOC, personnel from UNITAF's J-3 staffed the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC). Its missions were to act as the focal point for liaison with the HROs and to develop an overall relief strategy, arrange for military support to the HROs, and coordinate HRO logistics.<sup>20</sup>

However, establishment of the HOC and CMOC was not a panacea to allay preconceived stereotypes. The HOC's "chain of command" was nonexistent which prevented unity of effort, a principle of MOOTW required for joint team success. There was a stovepipe reporting system which allowed the UN Director to answer directly to the UN, the civilian Deputy Director from OFDA to answer to the United States Liaison Office and USAID, and the military Deputy Director to answer directly to UNITAF. Members of other miscellaneous organizations also answered directly to their appropriate headquarters.

Collocation of the HOC and CMOC with the UN headquarters caused coordination problems. The command structure and additional responsibilities of the J-3 officers required that they travel back and forth between UNITAF and the HOC. This delayed decisions and hindered relief actions. The final unity of effort that developed between UNITAF and the HROs was the result of the personalities of those involved not the organizational structure of the HOC.

At the national policy level, President Bush chose Robert Oakley as Special Envoy for Somalia, the civilian complement to UNITAF's commander. Prior to the arrival of UNITAF forces into each HRS, Mr. Oakley and his staff met with clan elders, religious leaders, and local political leaders. These meetings defused potential resistance to the UNITAF forces by explaining their objectives and laying the groundwork for reinstitution of the political

infrastructure.<sup>21</sup> To reinforce the information provided in these meetings, each military movement into a HRS was preceded with leaflets and announcements via loudspeakers to prepare the sector's inhabitants.

Establishing mini-HOCs in each HRS added to coordination problems. Requests for assistance were first approved at the mini-HOC and then forwarded to the national HOC. After the CMOC and OFDA concurred, the national HOC approved the request. The process loop was closed when the approved request was sent to UNITAF headquarters to task the appropriate military unit with the required support. Since the unit required was normally located within the HRS requiring the support, it became apparent that direct coordination with the HROs precluded forwarding the request, avoided time-consuming approval, and facilitated relief efforts.

With no full-blown combat operations to conduct, UNITAF had time to devote to humanitarian and civic assistance. Interpretation of the mission to support HROs fell into two categories: to provide security or to assist directly and indirectly in any manner requested. Eventually the two categories merged as military commanders inferred mission requirements. As a result, the HRO/military relationship improved. Logistical and engineering support was provided with both expertise and physical assets. It included drilling for water wells, improving airfields and road, and restoring a medical clinic, a schoolhouse, and an orphanage. Eventually health care and transportation also became implied missions. These humanitarian and civic assistance actions won the hearts and minds of the Somalis and established a second principle – legitimacy.

One of UNITAF's concerns was the appropriate level of force while providing security for the HROs. Peace operations place military personnel in roles as law enforcers in an environment where law has ceased to exist. UNITAF's rules of engagement (ROE) gave commanders flexibility to use force to defend themselves. However, in the context of international humanitarian law, force was limited to the minimum necessary to accomplish the objective and be proportional to the threat.<sup>22</sup> Given the opportunities for overreaction, the United States military forces exercised great discipline to prevent episodes from becoming international media events or inciting unpopular local opinion. While exercising a third principle of operations other than war, restraint, the military forces accomplished a fourth, that of security.

UNITAF's restraint, legitimacy, security, and unity of effort attained Operation Restore Hope's objective: create a secure environment for famine relief and transfer the operation to the UN. However, as previously mentioned, the mission was open to interpretation and initially

lacked a well-defined end state. Without a formal structure in which to operate, military and HRO interaction can add confusion to already uncertain conditions.

## **COOPERATION WITHIN THE CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER**

Once initiated, a humanitarian assistance operation requires a means to coordinate civil and military operations. Given the unfolding nature of the operation in response to the threat and the fluid political and emergency context, the handling of the political dimension at the strategic level will set the tone for the HRO/United States military relationship. At the operational and tactical level, this is not a natural relationship. HROs operate within their own charters and core values; the United States military follows orders as an instrument of national policy.<sup>23</sup> Coordination, collaboration, and consensus between the two entities are centered at a CMOC. Establishing a CMOC as the operational center of effort increases the success of implementing the NSS. The CMOC structure appeals to HROs because it avoids guesswork by providing positive direction for their efforts when and where most needed.

CMOCs are ad hoc organizations normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander. They assist in the coordination and execution of activities of engaged United States military forces and other United States government agencies, NGOs, PVOs, IOs, and regional organizations. There are no established structures; their size and composition are theater- and mission-dependent.<sup>24</sup> More than one CMOC may be established in an area of operation. CMOCs established in past operations yielded numerous lessons learned. Given that each humanitarian assistance operation is atypical, those lessons should be considered but not necessarily regarded as a strict framework.

HROs are resident before the military arrives, and they will remain when the military leaves. They bring humanitarian experience, familiarity with the area, and sustained commitment. The military command's staff, working independently as individuals in their fields of expertise or from their perspective of the situation, would be inefficient facilitators of relief efforts. However, placing selected staff in the CMOC alongside the HROs enables them to respond with a shared vision, each component learning from the other.

The military staff must be empowered to solve coordination problems directly with the HROs. Establishing the CMOC early in the operation provides a neutral place for each participant to serve its best interests: the HROs to seek primacy of the humanitarian need, and the military to assist in the effort to the next phase of recovery. The command should select military personnel for the CMOC who understand the political dimension of the emergency, who can foster cooperation and who understand that it's all right not to be in charge. With time to

react at a premium, this common understanding shortens the time required to determine the needs of the situation, to understand the dynamics that may impede or accelerate actions, to understand the comparative advantages of the HROs and other participants, and to understand how the military fits into the equation. This forms an exchange of services so that the relationship is mutually beneficial and prevents each organization from providing its own solution according to its own infrastructure.

The CMOC director should have direct and unlimited liaison with the Joint Task Force (JTF) commander. This contact fosters consensus building and unity of effort as it establishes the overall relief strategy. Coordination between the CMOC and the remainder of the JTF staff focuses on the end-state and mission objective and is a mutually beneficial relationship. The transition from conflict to humanitarian assistance operations requires the command to shift combat support and combat service support assets to the HROs. The military infrastructure assists with logistics, communication, and security critical to HROs rapid response and credibility with the assisted population. Once the civilian agencies regain relative stability, the military can depart.

The CMOC provides a structure for collaboration, consensus, and coordination between HROs and the military; it achieves unity of effort via consensus building. As the first indicator of changes during the continuum of effort, it should be the focus of the entire military effort during a humanitarian assistance operation. The synergism established will enable the military to transition smoothly along that continuum of effort – from assisting HROs with military infrastructure to withdrawal once relative stability is achieved.

## **DOCTRINE AND TRAINING**

At the conclusion of Operation Restore Hope in May 1993, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Peace-Enforcement Policy requested the DoD Inspector General to review current military training for peace operations. The resulting report acknowledged that combat skills, proficiency, and discipline are fundamental for success but that specific-to-mission training for peace operations was necessary. Findings among the services included: Army – initiated major doctrinal changes with new field manuals for operations other than war and conducts related training programs at three of its four combat training centers; Marine Corps – normal training programs are geared to operations other than war to a greater degree than other Services, but greater emphasis is placed on staff interfaces, organization integration, and cultural awareness; and the Navy and the Air Force – had initiated no changes to training program but were using leadership development programs to increase

awareness of operations other than war. Specifically this report recommended taking greater advantage of existing United States and foreign training and educational opportunities in the formulation of service and joint training programs; more aggressively implementing joint and combined peace operations training programs with existing software programs; and creating liaison positions for OFDA and the State Department.<sup>25</sup>

The Services and the entire Department of Defense (DoD) have taken this report to heart. Numerous joint publications have been written and represent major milestones in the efforts to improve coordination across the range of MOOTW. They provide the principles and guidance for coordination and outline responsibilities and tasks for joint force commanders for the creative and visionary use of United States military power. However, they do not restrict the authority of the joint force commander from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in accomplishment of the overall mission. Some, such as the Joint Warfighting Center's Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, are resource tools and are supplemented with various lessons learned databases and doctrinal publications.

Ideally, coordination with HROs begins prior to the humanitarian assistance operation. Training at all levels of military structure via exercises or conferences can address the demands placed upon the military and HROs in theater, define mission areas, and guide military forces through the intricacies of conducting non-traditional operations. Planning, particularly in the deliberate planning process, is essential to leveraging HRO capabilities. Not one organization has all the attributes to single-handedly resolve humanitarian assistance operations. Each element's tools include resources, manpower, organization, and skills to maximize the effectiveness of the operation when used in conjunction with the others tools. Planning fosters an appropriate distribution of tasks, an agreement on strategic goals, and, above all, an understanding of each other.

## **FUTURE IMPLICATIONS**

Deliberate coordination at the strategic level constitutes the principle mechanism for developing policy.<sup>26</sup> The NSC advises and assists the President in integrating all aspects of national security policy. It provides the foundation for interagency coordination for foreign operations. Those policies are promulgated through DoD doctrine to guide operational commanders in the conduct of MOOTW and includes establishing and maintaining relationships with, influencing the actions of, and exploiting the use of HRO assets.

As new international approaches, policies, and programs for dealing with humanitarian disasters unfold, the United States military holds a relatively rich pool of resources available to assist HROs. Military forces have an organizational base, material resources (food, fuel, and medical supplies), and a capacity for rapid response. In turn, HROs are important assets to employ during a period of declining military budgets. Commanders and planners at all levels must operate in conjunction with HROs.

The 21<sup>st</sup> century will change the Nation's security environment; its diverse ethnic conflicts and emerging states/alliances pose serious dangers to regional stability and will continue to challenge the United States. The increase in the number and types of MOOTW necessitates complementary interaction as directed by joint doctrine for training, education, and coordination between our military forces and HROs. Actual field operations will require the adaptation of policies and programs to fit changing conditions. The NSS and the supporting National Military Strategy (NMS) call upon United States military forces to conduct smaller-scale contingency (SSC) operations, which include humanitarian assistance and peace operations which are prominent in military mandates as we pursue the Nation's strategic goals and protect its vital, important, and humanitarian interests. These operations put a premium on the ability of the United States military to work closely and effectively with HROs.<sup>27</sup>

HROs should be viewed as force multipliers for the United States military as its roles and missions include operations short of major theater warfare. The experience level of military forces in cooperation with the capabilities of the HROs will form an effective instrument of United States foreign policy. Leveraging the two entities will achieve unity of effort and maximize the effectiveness of both organizations. Based on recent experience and intelligence estimates, the frequency of SSC operations is expected to remain high through the first twenty years of the 21st Century.<sup>28</sup> As the Nation's international relief efforts have increased in number and widened in scope, there is a continuous and deliberate reevaluation of the challenges encountered and the capabilities required. Solving the increasingly complex security challenges facing the United States requires the skills and resources of the HROs. Diverse, flexible, independent, and relief-focused, their assets and capabilities should be factored into the commander's assessment of conditions and resources and should be integrated into the selected course of action.<sup>29</sup>

The complexity of future operations short of major theater warfare requires United States military forces to participate effectively with HROs as elements of a unified international effort. The vital link between the military instrument of power and HROs is coordination when responding to crises to shape the world environment in ways that would have been

inconceivable only a few decades ago. Of great importance is the development of joint doctrine and organizations that translate that doctrine into effective leaders. This integrated approach achieves national objectives and makes optimum use of skills and resources provided by United States military forces and HROs. Early dialogue between military leaders at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and HROs will provide the link between strategic aims and tactical employment of capabilities. Ultimate success can be achieved only if United States military forces are educated, trained, and organized with those that play a vital role in future humanitarian assistance operations – the HROs. The result is an interdependent civil-military team that functions as an effective instrument of United States NSS.

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## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. I, Joint Publication 3-08 (Washington, D.C.: 1996), viii-ix.

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: 1998), 312.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 356.

<sup>4</sup> Jonathan T. Dworken, Military Relations With Humanitarian Relief Organizations: Observations From Restore Hope. CRM 93-140 (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1993), 14.

<sup>5</sup> Union of International Associations, ed., Yearbook of International Organizations, 1994/5 (Munich, Germany: K.G. Saur Verlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1994), Appendix 4.

<sup>6</sup> United Nations, "Department of Economical and Social Affairs (DESA NGO Section)," available from <<http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/ngosection.htm>>; Internet; accessed 4 Feb 2001.

<sup>7</sup> Nik Gowing, Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Commission, 1997), 8.

<sup>8</sup> Andrew S. Natsios, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 70-71.

<sup>9</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. II, Joint Publication 3-08 (Washington, D.C., 1996), A-M-1, -5.

<sup>10</sup> Natsios, 35-43.

<sup>11</sup> United Nations Secretariat, Security Council, Resolution 751, 24 April 1992, 2,14.

<sup>12</sup> United Nations Secretariat, Security Council, Resolution 775, 28 August 1992, 3.

<sup>13</sup> President George Bush, The Crisis in Somalia, Letter to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Washington, D.C.: 1993), 113.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Operation Restore Hope, The Military Operations in Somalia, 1993, 11.

<sup>16</sup> General Joseph P. Hoar, "A CINC's Perspective," Joint Forces Quarterly 2 (Autumn 1993): 60.

<sup>17</sup> Colonel F.M. Lorenz, "Law and Anarchy in Somalia," Parameters XXIII 4 (Winter 1993-94): 39.

<sup>18</sup> Jonathan T. Dworken, Military Relations With Humanitarian Relief Organizations: Observations From Restore Hope (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, October 1993), 22,29.

<sup>19</sup> Lorenz, 32.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>21</sup> Robert B. Oakley, "An Envoy's Perspective," Joint Forces Quarterly 2 (September 1993): 48.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Chris Seiple, The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions (Carlisle, PA: Peacekeeping Institute, Center for Strategic Leadership, 1996), 1.

<sup>24</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. II, Joint Publication 3-08 (Washington, D.C., 1996), GL-5.

<sup>25</sup> U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General, Program Evaluation of Specialized Military Training for Peace Operations (Arlington, VA: United States Government Printing Office, 1994), I-II, 41, 47.

<sup>26</sup> Jennifer Morrison Taw, Interagency Coordination in Military Operations other Than War (Washington, D.C.: Rand, 1997), 7.

<sup>27</sup> William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 1999), 18.

<sup>28</sup> William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000), 6.

<sup>29</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. I, Joint Publication 3-08 (Washington, D.C.: 1996), viii-ix.

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